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‘I see myself as an empirical
Keynesian’
Interview with Henri Sterdyniak
Henri Sterdyniak is a scientific adviser at the OFCE research institute – the Observatoire
français des conjonctures économiques – where he has been working for more than
30 years, among other posts as a director of the department ‘economics of globaliza-
tion’. From 1985 until 2013 he was also a professor of economics at the University
Paris Dauphine, France. He is also one of the founding members of the Économistes
Atterrés (the Appalled Economists), an association of French economists who object
to neoliberal policies, formed in 2010. He has written extensively on various topics,
including empirical macroeconomics, monetary policies, fiscal policies, globalization,
European policies, and more specifically social policies and retirement systems. He
has published hundreds of articles and reports, lately with Catherine Mathieu.
How did you come to economics?
I was studying at the École Polytechnique, which is a general engineering school. One day
an economist from the Communist Party, Philippe Herzog, who had also studied at the
Polytechnique, came to the school looking for economists with the strong belief that we
had to do economics for the people. The working class needed us because the Communist
Party would soon have governing responsibilities together with the Socialist Party, and the
Communist Party did not have enough experts in economics. It was 1972 and that is just
how some students at the École Polytechnique decided to start a career in economics.
They were convinced that it would contribute to the development of the society within
the political agenda of the Left, which would soon be governing France. Consequently,
I joined the ENSAE, the National School of Statistics and Economic Administration.
I also joined the economic team of the Communist Party working on the elaboration
of the common programme of the Left.
Who were the economists who influenced you most back then?
First Edmond Malinvaud, a professor at the ENSAE, and the general disequilibrium
school. The objective was to build theoretical models to explain disequilibrium situations
in specific markets, with fixed prices. We investigated how those imbalances impact wage
and price developments. Those models were highly complex because disequilibrium situa-
tions were changing from one market to another and because each market was affected by
spillovers arising from disequilibrium in the other markets. These disequilibria impacted
consumption and investment behaviour, and hence the capital stock and the productive
capacity of firms. Ultimately we studied whether these adjustments had stabilizing or
destabilizing effects.
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Another influence was the theory of monopoly capitalism, which goes back to Paul
Boccara and Philippe Herzog. This theory analysed how modern capitalist economies
worked by looking at the close relationship between large monopolist firms and the
State. The fusion between the State, large companies and financial institutions used to
be seen as a perverse system. Today, public intervention in the course of action of large
firms and financial institutions would be welcomed.
Was your work on disequilibrium theory linked to the seminar in econometrics or did it happen
as part of a university research institute?
This work took place when I was at the INSEE, the National Institute of Statistics and
Economic Studies, under the influence of Malinvaud. Those models with explicit disequi-
libria were really up-and-coming. We were convinced that they could offer an alternative
to general equilibrium models. They showed that different types of economic situations
may occur depending on specific disequilibrium. The most frequent disequilibrium was
the situation of Keynesian unemployment and not classical unemployment or overem-
ployment, which were in reality merely theoretical situations. Firms set their prices
with a certain mark-up so the normal equilibrium is inside the Keynesian area; economies
need to be hit by a strong shock to get out of this area. Even in France, the success of this
theory was short-lived. Its theorists were not able to make it evolve to integrate the new
aspects of modern economies like financialization and globalization.
It seems you also took an excursion into monetarism and its (lack of) empirical foundations?
When I graduated from the ENSAE, I worked on monetary issues with Jacques Melitz,
developing models of French and British monetary systems. Our papers on the simulation
of monetary systems got published in The American Economic Review and The Economic
Journal. As a monetarist Jacques Melitz had a great idea: he claimed that the equilibrium
between the money demand and the money supply was the key to macroeconomic equi-
librium. So the issue is, what is the good definition of money: M0, M1, M2 or M3? For
his project we would develop alternative models and verify which model between M0,
M1, M2 and M3 was the most accurate. By doing so I discovered that the question
was completely absurd. By integrating the behaviour of the central bank and that of com-
mercial banks into a satisfying macroeconomic model, we realized that these different
measures made no sense and that it was credit supply that really mattered. Then I
wrote my first published paper called ‘Regarding money supply’ (‘Du côté de l’offre de
monnaie’), which was published in the Annales de l’INSEE. I showed that money is endo-
genous and what really matters is credit, the reaction function of the central bank and the
behaviour of banks as credit suppliers. Non-financial economic agents choose between
a large variety of financial assets; it is rather arbitrary to separate monetary assets and
non-monetary ones; the money supply does not exist; what only matters is credit supply.
During my career, I wrote several articles on the importance of credit (or more generally of
financing), emphasizing that the concept of money is meaningless in modern financial
economies and supporting the idea of macroeconomics without money.
Was it linked to the post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money?
Yes, many scholars rediscovered the theory of endogenous money as laid down by post-
Keynesian economists. For those who specialized in empirical macroeconomics it was
obvious. Empirical models would include a reaction function of the central bank, which
would explain how it sets interest rates. They would also take the behaviour of firms towards
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indebtedness into account. At no time would they describe an equilibrium between money
supply and demand. Money had to be endogenous. This was supported by economists like
Jacques Le Bourva or Vivien Levy-Garboua, from the French central bank, who explained
that the money multiplier does not exist. Instead, there is a credit divisor.
What did you do after that?
I worked on short-term economic analysis and macroeconomic simulations at the INSEE.
We built a macroeconomic model called METRIC for short- and medium-term analyses.
We got many criticisms because METRIC did not include a financial sector. Pierre Villa
and myself built a model which integrated both the financial and real sectors. As a result,
we could provide a perfect and consistent model of a flow-of-funds matrix.
Was this a coherent stock-flow model, an econometric SFC model?
It wasn’t called an SFC model, but it was entirely consistent, as the financial sector was
fully integrated. However, this didn’t last long, because it was extremely costly to main-
tain. In order to provide estimates and projections, we needed data. We were constantly
limited by the delay required to obtain coherent financial data. But the main difficulty was
to establish links between the financial and the real sector. For this model to actually work,
real behaviour had to be impacted by financial stocks; consumption had to depend on the
gap between current and desired wealth; investment had to depend on the gap between
the actual and the desired debt level, etc. Exchange-rate modelling was also very proble-
matic since we tried to estimate a French demand for foreign assets and a foreign demand
for French assets. Another problem was that we had to simulate financial prices, such as
equity prices and housing prices. We worked a lot but we were not able to provide a
model which was satisfactory enough for the INSEE economic forecasts. Later, I became
an associate professor at the Paris Dauphine University (in 1985). By then I was author-
ized to supervise doctoral dissertations. With this so-called research accreditation and my
articles published in scientific journals such as The American Economic Review and The
Economic Journal, I didn’t need to do a PhD.
When did you join the OFCE?
Let me tell you two stories. From 1975 to 1980 at the INSEE, Patrick Artus and myself
worked intensively with METRIC, our model of the French economy. In 1980, we were
asked to study what is named in France the ‘TVA sociale’, which is a reform aimed at repla-
cing the employer’s social contributions by a value-added tax, to create jobs. We published a
paper explaining that this project was illusory, that the right strategy to create jobs was to cut
labour costs and to tax capital to induce substitution effects between capital and labour. The
Prime Minister, Raymond Barre, didn’t like it at all. He decided that the INSEE needed
some competition and he promoted the creation and funding of new independent research
institutions: the OFCE was related to the university, the IRES (Institute of Economic and
Social Research) to the trade unions and IPECODE (Institut de prévisions économiques et
financières pour le développement des entreprises) to the employers’ organizations. At the
INSEE we were strong opponents of this idea because we were convinced that pluralism
should be promoted within the INSEE and the public administration, not outside, in an
academic organization. Then, in 1981, the Left won the election and the French financial
administration was very reluctant to support the new Left government. In 1983, with the
austerity turn, I was given to understand that I was too independent and insubordinate, that
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my work was too original for the financial administration, and that I would be better off
outside the INSEE, for instance at the OFCE. That’s how I joined the OFCE.
How long did you stay at the OFCE?
I’m still there, 35 years later. The great advantage of the OFCE is that it is an independent
research centre. In contrast to the public administration, which has more or less an official
doctrine, we can publish freely at the OFCE, the only criterion being the scientific quality of
the work. That’s an interesting issue for pluralism: besides scholars, the other economists
working for the administration, for banks or firms, for central banks or for the European
commission, have to follow a certain way of thinking. This must be a difficult situation:
either you keep quiet and make a career or you leave.
How did you become a founding member of the Économistes Atterrés in 2010?
First, let me answer another question. To start with, from a theoretical point of view, I see
myself as an empirical Keynesian. Empirical Keynesians observe the economic situation
and its developments. They try to describe them in the most accurate way, by doing
econometrics and empirical studies. However, they don’t have a set theoretical framework.
Empirical Keynesians also have the somewhat naïve belief that capitalism can be
improved, that capitalism could work in a more satisfactory way with a large social com-
promise for a mixed economy. On the one hand there is the private sector and capitalism,
and on the other hand there is 50 per cent of GDP which is socially redistributed and
managed, with social benefits, progressive taxes, free schooling and so on. Naïve Keyne-
sian scholars defend this system. They also believe that the State should influence the eco-
nomic situation to maintain full employment. And some of them, like me, believe that the
State should engage in industrial policy. That is what we fight for. For instance, I fought
for the French pay-as-you-go system when in the 1990s many economists were criticizing
our public retirement system because it delivered a return of only 2 per cent per year in
real terms, far below the 10 per cent that they expected from financial markets.
That’s one point. The other is that we need an economic policy that supports eco-
nomic activity. We should not comply with arbitrary norms regarding public debt and
deficit. Instead, we need a functional fiscal policy, which looks after the economic situa-
tion and not after a so-called public finance equilibrium. That’s the point of view of naïve
Keynesians who are pragmatic. They are not post-Keynesians because they don’t claim to
have an original theoretical point of view.
From 1995 to 2007, we had to live with the myth of the new economy, with the belief
that everything would be fine because of the development of new technologies, trade and
financial globalization. Under this myth, finance makes stabilization policies and social
insurances useless. The fiscal multiplier is nil, or even negative. Heterodox economists
talked to deaf ears when they evoked the growth of inequalities and the risks of financial
instability.
In 2007/2008, the crisis showed that the current financial capitalism is an unsustain-
able regime, not only in terms of financial instability but also for the economy as a whole.
Thanks to trade globalization and the neoliberalism counter-revolution, capital has
increased its profitability requirement, so wages and public spending must decrease,
which is not compatible with the macroeconomic equilibrium. Growth must be sustained
by financial bubbles and debt increases, which end with a financial crash and a debt crisis.
In 2007/2008 the system broke down and in 2009 we had a Keynesian moment where
both the political leaders and the technocracy reacted with appropriate economic policies
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and financial regulations. But this moment did not last; very rapidly, the IMF and the
European Commission once again advocated restrictive fiscal policies and liberal structural
reforms.
This is when you thought that this was enough, and that something had to be done?
Yes, in 2010, after a seminar, we were five people, sitting down in a café, talking about the
current economic situation and thinking that it was dramatic. With the implementation
of austerity policies and the lack of efficient measures against the financial sector, there was
a risk of making the same mistakes all over again. As economists we felt that we had the
responsibility to intervene and explain, that financial markets are inefficient and destabi-
lizing, that financial speculation is bringing us to the brink of a catastrophe, that we need
to change the rules in Europe, that euro area member states should not obey the ‘stupid’
rules of the Stability Pact, that Europe must change its objectives, should stop requesting
member states to reform towards the liberal model and instead fight inequalities and con-
trol globalization. That’s why we wrote the Manifeste des Économistes Atterrés (Ashkenazy
et al. 2010).
It was a very successful text, which allowed us to build and strengthen the association
of the Économistes Atterrés. It is quite influential now in France; it enables us to con-
tribute to every single debate over economic policies and offer an alternative discourse to
orthodox economists. The Économistes Atterrés is of course a pluralist movement with
Marxist, pragmatic Keynesians, post-Keynesians, labour economists, ecologists … . The
main objective is to fight neoliberalism. But we need also to gain from our differences.
Keynesians must take into account the ecological considerations. We cannot leave the
productive economy to capitalists, with the State intervening only for stabilization
and redistribution purposes. It is not possible to let large firms impose their choices
with regard to production and consumption, with their profits as a unique criterion,
as it leads towards an ecological catastrophe. More powers should be given to workers
and citizens.
The Économistes Atterrés are very influential in the French debate. You have a book that can be
bought everywhere. Catherine Mathieu told me that you were travelling around the country
and that there were halls that you were filling, and that of course you were often invited to
radio and television shows, so you were highly successful. Do you have a feeling that the move-
ment has become stronger, or is it the same or maybe weaker now?
The movement was very successful from the beginning. We went to every city in France,
well, every city with a university, and presented the Manifesto. We are a reference in the
economic debate, because people know that we have an alternative point of view.
That’s why the media invite us. But then the French people got very disappointed by
the five-year presidency of François Hollande, which is a bit difficult to deal with. It’s
hard to propose alternatives in the current context.
How do you feel about the two authors of the book,1 the translation of which could read as ‘The
economic negationism and how to get rid of it’, and their criticism of the Économistes Atterrés
and other heterodox economists? Do you think it’s a reaction to your growing influence?
Yes, it is a criticism of the Économistes Atterrés, the AFEP – the French Association of
Political Economy – and the magazine Alter Éco. There are many explanations.
1. See Cahuc/Zylberberg (2016).
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First you have to consider that it is not us but the MEDEF, the French Employers’
Association, which has the largest influence in the debate over political economy in
France. On behalf of the employers, the MEDEF launched an aggressive campaign
claiming that the State has to cut taxes on firms and on wealthier people, to reduce
social contributions, to reduce social and public spending, to weaken labour rights,
to facilitate lay-offs and help private entrepreneurs. This was based on the claim that
only entrepreneurs are productive, while the public sector lives at the expense of the
private sector. The Valls–Macron government has accepted this discourse. This cam-
paign enjoyed a great success among journalists who have criticized François Hollande
for not having sufficiently reduced public spending. This is the dominant ideology in
the media, and in a large part of the population. We try to fight this neoliberal ideology,
and it’s not an easy task in France. Almost all the media belong to a few business own-
ers, which is a rather special situation. On top of that, orthodox economists are taking
over the universities and it’s becoming very difficult for heterodox scholars to get full
professor positions.
The two authors of the book, Cahuc and Zylberberg, want to destroy the credibility of
those who have a different methodological approach. For them there is only one economic
science, which considers the Walrasian model as the ultimate goal, with all disequilibria
arising from institutions which introduce rigidities, as argued in Anglo-Saxon economic
journals. In 2006, they would have written that economists who did not believe in
DSGE models, in the efficiency of financial markets or in the negative fiscal multiplier
were negationists.
As labour-market experts, Cahuc and Zylberberg advocate the reduction or even the
abolition of the minimum wage, the reduction of labour costs for low-wage earners and
the weakening of labour rights, and they believe that the labour market will automatically
reach an equilibrium point without these rigidities. Their work is often financed by fed-
erations of companies, whose labour force consists mostly of low-wage earners. From an
ethical point of view, this is quite ironic.
They have this crazy theory that the only problem is the failure of the French labour
market, while completely ignoring the problems created by globalization and financial
instability, problems which hit the workers’ situation in all developed industrial countries.
They ignore all macroeconomic issues. They pretend that there is only one valid way
of doing economic research. Their so-called scientific work really makes no sense. For
example, their claim that working-time reduction in France did not have any effect on
employment is based on a single study, which had earlier been criticized because of
its methodological shortcomings.2 Many serious works showing that the shift to the
35-hour working week created nearly 350 000 jobs contradict this claim.
Two last questions. First, a more general question about the constraints of the eurozone and the
Maastricht treaty: Is there a solution that could help the European community to get out of the
economic slump we’re experiencing now? Or do we have to leave the euro?
The eurozone is something that has never been properly thought out and exhibits many
original sins. It is not only the stupid Stability and Growth Pact or the fiscal compact.
Experience shows that member states are different and they do not converge. Thus they
need flexible exchange rates. The fixed exchange rate led to catastrophes and misguided
strategies, such as the German strategy to accumulate external surpluses without
exchange-rate appreciation, or the strong external indebtedness of southern countries
2. See Coriat et al. (2017).
288 European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention, Vol. 14 No. 3
© 2017 The Author Journal compilation © 2017 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 12/17/2017 01:36:15PM
via University of Ottawa
before the crisis. The eurozone project has really been poorly designed. Hence there are
two solutions. The first one is to pull out of the eurozone. We know that it’s going to be
difficult and that we’ll have to go through a crisis but it is possible: a left-wing party
comes to power in a big country and refuses the Stability and Growth Pact, the fiscal
compact and the national reform programs. The second possibility is for all the Eur-
opean countries to agree and make the eurozone work. In this case, they remove the
Stability and Growth Pact, the fiscal treaties and the liberal structural reforms. They
introduce pragmatic management of the eurozone consisting of collectively finding,
through coordination without arbitrary rules, the right solutions to the actual imbal-
ances. Currently this means that the euro area needs expansionary policies because it
is characterized by a massive trade surplus and high unemployment. Eurozone member
states need large investment plans centred on an ecological transition: wages should
increase in surplus countries; social security systems should converge upwards; fiscal sys-
tems should be harmonized with minimum rates for the wealthiest people and large
firms. Industrial policies should be geared towards the ecological transition, with specific
measures to favour the southern countries. We know how to do it, but the problem is to
convince all member states that it is the solution. How do you tell the Germans, ‘listen,
there is no problem, just raise your pensions by 25 per cent and you’ll help your pen-
sioners and your European partners; you can do it, you have an 8-percentage-point trade
surplus’? The problem is to change the European goals and make the member states stop
obsessing about public debt and deficit. How do you make them realize that the goal
must be full employment? How do we change the objectives of European institutions,
when Europe is used by the leading classes and the European and national technocracies
to impose structural liberal reforms?
And the last question, probably the most difficult one. What advice do you have for young post-
graduates who want to specialize in economics and are heterodox? What should they focus on,
should they do a lot of econometrics? Should they compromise with orthodox models, should they
fully claim their heterodox thinking or should they be pragmatic Keynesians?
I think that you have to be a pragmatic Keynesian and to request the right of doing
economics in a different way. We need research in political economy to try to explain
and understand how institutions work, how we can improve them and what are the
social, political and economic compromises that make the society progress in the
right (or the wrong) direction. Until now we lived in Europe with a compromise
that emerged from the Second World War, with a mix of capitalism and social democ-
racy. This compromise is now questioned by the rise of neoliberalism, of financial glo-
balization and the fact that leading classes increasingly see the future of their companies
outside Europe. Today, an interesting research topic would be to try to understand the
evolution of our society and economy with all the contradictions that it entails. Of
course, Europe is a great contradiction too. On the one hand it is dominated by neo-
liberalism; on the other hand it is a beautiful dream. Europe must remain the leading
zone for social protection, labour rights and ecological transition.
So, basically, you should be a pragmatic and institutionalist economist?
Yes, you could be a pragmatic and institutionalist Keynesian. Whether you will find a job
by doing so is a tricky question!
This interview was conducted in French by Achim Truger and Marc Lavoie in October 2016,
at the FMM conference in Berlin. We thank Camille Lafortune for the transcription and
Aanor Roland for the translation.
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